Change blindnessöour inability to detect large changes in natural scenes when saccades, blinks and other transients interrupt visual inputöseems to contradict psychophysical evidence for our exquisite sensitivity to contrast changes. Can the type of e¡ects described as`change blindness' be observed with simple, multi-element stimuli, amenable to psychophysical analysis?
INTRODUCTION
There has recently been great interest in the topic of change blindness' (Pashler 1988; Rensink et al. 1997) , here understood as the visual system's inability to detect large changes introduced during saccades, blinks and other transients. This interest (see Becker & Anstis 1997; Blackmore et al. 1995; Hayhoe et al. 1997; Irwin 1997; O'Regan et al. 1996; Orbach & Scott-Brown 1997; Rensink et al. 1997; Simons 1996; has been generated by elegant and surprising experiments, where enormous changes in the visual world go unnoticed when introduced during a saccade (Grimes 1996) or an arti¢-cial`blink' (Blackmore et al. 1995; Rensink et al. 1997 ). An example of such an e¡ect, studied by Rensink et al., is shown in ¢gure 1a where subjects required, on average, 16.2 temporal repetitions to identify the change between two scenes.
These e¡ects pose several fundamental questions for vision science.
1. Why are such huge changes undetectable when the visual system can be so exquisitely sensitive to minute changes in contrast (e.g. Legge & Kersten 1987) ? In particular, can known psychophysical results for simple stimuli be reconciled with these e¡ects using standard theories of early visual attention? 2. Does change blindness re£ect an abstract and sketchy coding of visual information (Blackmore et al. 1995; Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin 1995; Dennett 1991 ; O'Regan 1992)? 3. Is change blindness due to the e¡ects of sensory processes or to de¢cits in attention or memory? Can change blindness be linked to well-studied problems in vision such as visual search?
With these questions in mind, we set out to determine whether large changes in relatively simple stimuli would also be undetectable. (`Large' meaning changes easily detectable in isolation or when cued.) In addition, we explored some of the determining conditions for the presence and absence of change blindness.
METHODS (a) Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented on a grey background (luminance: 135 cd m 72 ) on a Philips Brightview monochrome monitor, set to its low, one-gun, mode. Each pixel measured 0.46 mm Â 0.46 mm. A 59 cm wide by 54 cm high rectangular mask, with a circular aperture of radius 9.7 cm (2.9³ visual angle at the subject distance of 1.9 m), was illuminated by two tungsten bulbs to match, as uniformly as possible, the mean luminance of the screen. A range of screen luminance values was measured with a Minolta LS-110 luminance meter. The nonlinear calibration curve thus obtained was used to set the maxima of the patterns to the contrast values quoted throughout this paper. We estimate that residual nonlinearities using this procedure were less than 5% of the maximum contrast for each pattern, which is well within the range of spatial nonlinearities in luminance intrinsic to the monitor. Our stimuli were single-or multi-element patterns always presented for 250 ms. The elements were patches with two-dimensional luminance pro¢les described by a D 6 (sixth derivative of a Gaussian) local contrast function, varying in the vertical direction, and modulated by a horizontally varying Gaussian (Wilson et al. 1983) . The contrast function for one patch is therefore
where ' x 10 pixels, and ' y 5 pixels, giving a dominant spatial frequency of 8 cycles deg
71
. The compound patterns formed from these patches are illustrated in ¢gure 1b. A Macintosh IIci computer controlled stimulus presentation and recorded subjects' responses.
(b) Procedure
In conditions 1^4, contrast increment thresholds were measured for elements using the method of constant stimuli and a temporal two-alternative forced choice protocol. The two stimulus presentations were separated by an`interrupt', a 50% contrast blank (as also used in the change blindness`blink' paradigm) that lasts at least one second, between the two patterns. In each trial within a block, a constant`base' pattern was compared with a variable`increment' pattern. For multielement patterns, the increment pattern was identical to the base except that one of the component elements had a higher contrast. The position of the incremented element randomly varied from trial to trial, with all positions equally represented within a block of trials. The increment appeared randomly in the ¢rst or second stimulus presentation. For both single-and multi-element conditions, the subject had to determine whether the one component element with higher contrast appeared in the ¢rst or second stimulus presentation. The subject was not required to determine the spatial location of the changed component element. (In a control experiment, condition 5 below, thresholds were comparable for a spatial localization task.) Details for each condition are presented below. An example of the stimulus presentation sequence for the cued condition is illustrated in ¢gure 1b.
In conditions 1, 2, 3 and 5, contrast increment thresholds were determined for elements at base contrasts of 5, 10, 20, 40 and 60%. In condition 4, the base contrasts were 10, 20, and 40%. The increment element was randomly varied between one of six values above the base level (see table 1 ). These values were chosen on the basis of pilot data to optimally span the range of increments necessary to ¢x thresholds for all conditions. 2160 K. C. Scott-Brown and H. S. Orbach Contrast, non-uniform patterns and change blindness Performance was recorded as the percentage of correct decisions. Thence contrast increment thresholds, a standard psychophysical measure, were calculated by ¢tting data with a two-parameter Weibull curve (Pelli 1985) . Put simply, this threshold de¢nes the half-way point between contrast increments where subjects never detect changes and contrast increments where they always detect changes. Experimental sessions typically lasted one hour. Subjects practised until they felt con¢dent with each task before data-taking sessions were performed.
(c) Observers
Observers were aged between 20 and 35 years with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects viewed the stimuli binocularly through natural pupils at a distance of 1.9 m. Two of the three subjects were unaware of the purpose of the experiment. The remaining subject, KSB, was an experienced psychophysical observer.
RESULTS

(a) Condition 1
Our ¢rst measurement was made to obtain a baseline for a simple stimulus comparable to those used to obtain standard contrast increment thresholds. The stimulus was a single element at ¢xation. Each subject did 30 discrimination tasks at each of the 30 contrast increment levels (six increment values for each of the ¢ve base levels). In this condition, the ¢rst stimulus appeared 1100 ms after the subject initiated each trial pair with a mouse click. It was then followed by a 1200 ms interstimulus interval and then the second stimulus.
The baseline data for our study, contrast increment thresholds for three subjects, are shown as the open squares in ¢gure 2. The error bars in all conditions represent intersubject variability expressed as the standard error of the means.
The stimuli for our second,`mixed contrast', condition were ¢ve elements in a ring at eccentricity 0.7³ from the ¢xation point. (Because the entire pattern is well within the fovea, eccentricity should have a small e¡ect on contrast increment thresholds. From the results of Legge & Kersten (1987 , p.1597 , we would expect the threshold evaluation, for all but the lowest base contrast to rise by at most 10% due to eccentricity e¡ects.) The pattern was rotated 36³ from that which would form a vertical pentagon to remove any obvious vertical or horizontal symmetry axes. The`base' pattern had the ¢ve constituent elements at the di¡erent base contrasts of 5, 10, 20, 40 and 60%. The base contrasts were randomly assigned to ¢xed positions for each block of trials. In the incremented pattern, one of these elements was set to a higher contrast, as illustrated in ¢gure 1b. Subjects determined which presentation had the higher contrast element. A ¢xation point was present throughout the trials. The ¢xa-tion point was a 71.0 contrast`di¡erence of Gaussians' (DOG) spot, with a space constant of 2 pixels. One thousand one hundred milliseconds after the subject initiated the trial the ¢rst pattern appeared, followed by a 1200 ms interstimulus interval and the second pattern. Contrast increment thresholds, the ¢lled circles in ¢gure 2, were determined for 30 discriminations at each of the 30 contrast increment levels (six values for each of the ¢ve base levels), as shown in table 1.
A convenient way of comparing di¡erent conditions is to normalize contrast increment thresholds by those for the single-element conditions. This yields the threshold elevation factor for each contrast. This factor was computed individually for each subject and the mean threshold elevation factor over subjects was calculated for each base contrast. Finally, an average over contrasts was calculated to generate an average threshold elevation factor for each condition.
As shown in ¢gure 2, increment thresholds were considerably higher than for the single-element condition. The threshold elevation factor here was 3.4, thus thresholds were, on average, almost three-and-a-half times larger than those for a single element. For a 20% base contrast, this factor was 5.1. Thus, we have demonstrated, for simple patterns, one part of the phenomenology of change blindness: an inability to see very large changes in a visual stimulus.
(d) Condition 3
Another signi¢cant part of change blindness is the astonishing salience of these changes once they are either cued or noticed (Rensink et al. 1997) . To determine whether this also occurs for our patterns, the third condition measured the e¡ect of cueing. This was identical to the`mixed contrast' condition except that prior to each Contrast, non-uniform patterns and change blindness K. C. Scott-Brown and H. S. Orbach 2161
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998) stimulus, a small (2-pixel) space constant, 50% contrast, DOG cue spot was presented for 100 ms. The stimulus presentation sequence is shown in ¢gure 1b. Performance is shown by the ¢lled squares in ¢gure 2. The e¡ect of cueing is clear. Cued performance is almost as good as that for a single element with a threshold elevation factor of 1.4. For a 20% base contrast, this factor was 2.0.
(e) Condition 4
Having shown surprisingly large contrast increment thresholds for such a simple pattern in the mixed contrast condition, we looked to see if large e¡ects could be seen for even fewer constituent elements. In condition 4, we therefore used three elements in a ring at the same 0.7³ eccentricity. This condition also used a mixed contrast base pattern and the same timings as the corresponding ¢ve-element`mixed contrast' condition, but with three elements at 10, 20 and 40% contrast. Contrast increment thresholds were determined for 30 discriminations at each of the 18 contrast increment levels (six values for each of the three base levels). The results for this are shown by the ¢lled squares in ¢gure 3a with the data for a single element and data for ¢ve elements displayed for comparison. The threshold elevation factor of 2.6 for three elements, although not quite as high as that for ¢ve elements (3.4), is high compared to that for a single element (1.0). For a 20% base contrast, the threeelement threshold elevation factor was 3.7.
(e) Condition 5
The results so far were determined using a standard psychophysics paradigm: a two-alternative forced choice task to determine which stimulus presentation contained the pattern with an element of higher contrast. Are these thresholds comparable to those for other tasks used in change blindness studies?
To address this question, we performed a control experiment where the subjects' task was to determine at which spatial position the change in contrast occurred. The stimuli were the same as used in the mixed contrast condition. The only di¡erence in this condition was that at the end of the second stimulus presentation, a radial cursor appeared which the subject rotated using the computer mouse to indicate the position of the contrast change. Results for the two available subjects are presented in ¢gure 4. Data for the temporal task, mixed condition (solid circles), and for the single-element condition (open squares), are shown for comparison. The solid squares represent the data for the spatial task of identifying which element changed. The mean threshold elevation factor for the spatial task was 4.0 (compared to 3.4 for the temporal task). For a 20% base contrast, this factor was 3.8 (compared to 5.1 for the temporal task). It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that performance for determining`what element changed?' is comparable to that of determining`was the change an increase or decrease in contrast ?'.
DISCUSSION
The results presented above show that the basic phenomenology of change blindness can be demonstrated for simple patterns with as few as three constituents. As described below, changes are hard to detect only when such patterns have elements of widely varying contrasts. When the elements are the same contrast, the task is much easier with performance close to that for a single element. Moreover, even in the case of widely di¡erent elements, when the location of a change is cued, performance approaches that of a single element.
Change blindness has, to date, been viewed in the context of the psychological approach to perception. Our study has generated a novel exemplar of change blindness that can also be conveniently analysed by a psychophysical approach. We have demonstrated that this exemplar is similar to other cases of change blindness (Becker & 2162 K. C. Scott-Brown and H. S. Orbach Contrast, non-uniform patterns and change blindness Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998) Figure 3 . Contrast thresholds as a function of the number of constituents in a pattern. (a) Thresholds plotted for di¡erent base contrasts. The ability to detect changes in contrast is greatly degraded for three-element as well as ¢ve-element patterns, compared to that for a single element. (b) Thresholds plotted as function of set size. Data from ¢gures 2 and 3a are replotted to show the dependence of increment threshold on number of constituents in a pattern. The thick line shows a line of best ¢t for data from a contrast increment threshold experiment of Palmer (1995, ¢g. 3) . The slope for our uniform contrast condition (consistent with that of Palmer), argues against a capacity limit for early spatial attention and is consistent with a decision model. However, the data for the mixed contrast condition has a much higher regression coe¤cient (0.98), inconsistent with a decision model. Anstis 1997; Blackmore et al. 1995; Grimes 1996; Hayhoe et al. 1997; Irwin 1997; O'Regan et al. 1996; Rensink et al. 1997; Simons 1996; in the surprising inability to see large changes, and in the e¡ect of cues to restore change detection. The remainder of the discussion looks at the implications of our experiment for both perspectives and addresses the issue of the locus for these e¡ects.
(a) Can sensory or early attentional theories explain our results?
A discussion of our results using anatomically based mechanisms or computational entities such as`attention' or types of`memory' can raise vexed de¢nitional and even ontological issues (Dennett 1991; Uttal 1981) . Provisionally, to frame our discussion, we will use these terms in a notational, empirically de¢ned way (Palmer 1995) , as presented below. (We recognize that even this limited commitment may be misleading.) (i) Purely`sensory' degradation of performance arises from those factors that cannot be superseded by a voluntary shift in the observer's strategy. (ii)Àttentional' de¢cits, as distinguished from`memory' de¢cits, are those non-sensory de¢cits that can be demonstrated in an individual stimulus presentation and are not restricted to memory-based comparisons of two stimuli. Thus, although attentional de¢cits can indirectly impair memory performance, they can also impair tasks that do not involve memory. An example is the uniform contrast condition described below. Even if one considers this uniform contrast condition not to be a memory task, it will be equally a¡ected by such de¢cits. (Note that even the multi-element, mixed contrast case could, in principle, be carried out by comparing individual stimuli to an internal standard. An investigation of this, using an alternative`roving threshold' paradigm (Durlach & Braida 1969 ) and the issue of whether even this might use single presentation comparisons to internal standards, is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to the preceding reference and to literature on categorical perception (Harnad 1987 ) and direct scaling techniques (Stevens 1962 ).) (iii) A memory de¢cit, as we choose to use the term, is a de¢cit directly linked to the comparison of two stimuli over time. Thus attentional or sensory de¢cits may indirectly a¡ect a comparison task but only through their e¡ects on individual stimuli.
Having set this vocabulary, we discuss the relationship of our results to various mechanisms commonly thought to be involved in visual performance.
Is the increase in increment threshold of the mixed multi-element stimulus condition due to sensory factors? Could a`contrast normalization' (analogous to : Heeger 1992; Pokorny & Smith 1997; Wilson & Humanski 1993) for higher contrast elements elevate thresholds for lower contrast elements? The cued mixed contrast condition was a control for this and other sensory factors which, by de¢nition, are beyond conscious control. The lowering of the threshold that accompanied cueing showed that a large fraction of threshold elevation could not arise from sensory factors. (Note that the minor residual e¡ects, re£ected in the di¡erence in thresholds between the cued and single-element condition might be due to sensory factors.) (We would like to thank one of our reviewers for pointing out that sensory versus attentional mechanisms could also be investigated by looking for learning e¡ects that may be larger for higher order mechanisms than for sensory mechanisms.)
Can the performance of subjects in the mixed contrast condition be explained by`early attentional' factors? We will begin by considering theories of`pre-allocated spatial attention'. These are particularly interesting because they make quantitative predictions for experiments such as ours. (Note that these theories also make predictions for single presentation tasks, usually considered to be`search tasks' (Palmer et al. 1993; Verghese & Nakayama 1994) .) Recent discussions (Davis et al. 1983; Palmer 1995; Shaw 1980; Verghese & Nakayama 1994) have used psychophysical tests to compare two di¡erent attentional explanations for why performance on a range of visual tasks declines with multi-element stimuli. One explanation,`capacity limited attention' (e.g. Posner et al. 1980) , proposes a limited amount of attentional resources that has to be shared by multiple locations with a concomitant loss of discriminability. A di¡erent explanation, decision noise' (Palmer 1995; Shaw 1980) puts no limit on attentional resources, but notes that since discrimination is a noise limited process, the more locations attended the greater the noise and the lower the discriminability. Decision noise limited models have been successful in predicting data for multiple gratings (Davis et al. 1983 ) and disks (Palmer 1995) . However, as we will next show, using two arguments, neither capacity limited nor decision noise limited spatial allocation of attention can consistently explain the full range of our results.
In a`uniform contrast' control experiment, we used multi-element patterns similar to those used in the`mixed contrast' condition, with the sole di¡erence that all elements had identical base contrasts. Subjects again had to determine which presentation had the higher contrast element. Contrast increment thresholds were determined in separate blocks for each base contrast with 30 trials at each increment contrast shown in table 1. This uniform contrast condition is quite di¡erent from the mixed contrast condition (i.e. subjects can perform it by simply looking for a higher contrast element during each separate presentation, without it being necessary to compare the two presentations within a trial). Nevertheless,`preallocated spatial attention' mechanisms (both`capacity limited attention' and`decision noise') would produce the same de¢cit for both the uniform and mixed contrast condition. Thus, the uniform contrast condition is useful for deciding whether these particular explanations, applied to single presentation tasks, might explain the poor performance seen in change blindness experiments.
We found that the threshold elevation factor for the ¢ve-element uniform contrast condition over the singleelement condition was a modest 1.6; i.e. on average, thresholds for ¢ve uniform elements were 1.6 times higher than those for a single element. For a 20% base contrast, this factor was 2.2. This rise in thresholds is consistent with the`decision noise' model.
Our ¢rst argument against either one of the early attentional causes of our observed de¢cits therefore rests on the di¡erent thresholds for the uniform and mixed contrast conditions. Either capacity limited allocation of attentional resources or decision noise should predict the same contrast increment thresholds for both uniform and mixed contrast conditions. Consider capacity limited allocation of attentional resources. In both conditions, since increments are randomly assigned to spatial location, a uniform allocation of attentional resources will be the optimum strategy (these theories typically assume that subjects are able to pursue the optimum strategy). Thus, if capacity limitations in spatial attention were producing the high thresholds in the mixed condition, they would also predict high thresholds for the uniform condition, contrary to our observations. The alternative, decision noise, theories also predict decision noise to be the same for both conditions under the standard assumption that noise does not depend on contrast. It predicts the observed threshold for the uniform condition, but not that for the mixed contrast condition.
The second investigation of whether these early attentional factors cause the large de¢cits observed in mixed contrast conditions examines`set size e¡ects' (see Graham 1989; Palmer 1995; Shaw 1980) . The set size e¡ect is a decrement in performance (increase in thresholds) as a function of the number of elements in a stimulus. One can conveniently compare data to model predictions by plotting the logarithm of the increase in threshold as a function of the logarithm of the number of elements in the stimulus (Palmer 1995) . The decision noise model predicts a slope of approximately 0.25 for this function, the capacity limited model predicts a slope of approximately 0.75. (The slope of approximately 0.25 for the decision model is determined by a numerical solution of an integral equation. The larger slope of the log^log function of approximately 0.75 for the capacity model, results from an additive factor of 0.5, re£ecting the typical 1/ n p dependence of signal-to-noise when ¢xed resources have to be spread out over n locations (Palmer et al. 1993) . We calculated slopes for the six base contrasts in the uniform contrast control condition and in the mixed contrast conditions. The six slopes for the uniform contrast varied between 70.07 and 0.53, with an arithmetic mean of 0.22. This is consistent with the predictions of the decision noise model. However, for every contrast, the mixed condition showed higher set size e¡ect: slopes ranging from 0.201 .02, with a mean of 0.63. This was not consistent with the prediction of the decision noise model but could be consistent with the prediction of the capacity limited model. However, as explained above, the capacity limited model, as implemented in its`pre-allocated spatial attention' form, could not then explain the slope for the uniform case. As a speci¢c illustration, ¢gure 3b shows our data for one, three, and ¢ve pattern elements compared with the line of best ¢t for a similar paradigm, at the same base contrast, presented by Palmer (1994) . Our data for the uniform contrast condition is in good agreement with his, but it is clear that the line of best ¢t for our mixed contrast data has a much steeper slope. In summary, the two major quantitative theories for pre-allocated spatial attention considered above cannot consistently explain our experimental results. A claim that the poor performance on the mixed condition is due to a capacity de¢cit in early spatial attention fails to explain the better performance for the uniform condition. Although decision noise models ¢t data from other studies and our uniform contrast condition, they cannot ¢t the mixed contrast condition. Thus, although decision noise may be a limiting factor of performance, it is not`the' limiting factor responsible for change blindness. This suggests that we must look outside sensory or early attentional factors for the cause of change blindness.
(b) Can higher order attentional e¡ects explain our results?
If common`early attention' models will not explain our data, can other models of attention do so? Suggestions for mechanisms such as the ones in the following paragraph come from search experiments with inhomogeneous distractors (Duncan & Humphreys 1989; Pashler 1987) .
It is possible that dynamic shifts in attention, either exogenously captured or endogenously moved (Posner et al. 1980) , could explain a di¡erence in performance between the uniform and the mixed conditions. For example, in an exogenous, attention capture model, aǹ odd-man' incremented contrast element surrounded by uniform`background' elements, would produce local di¡erences in contrast between elements that could either directly signal the presence of an`odd-man' or attract resources for more detailed contrast evaluation. Such a mechanism would only improve performance in the uniform and not in the mixed condition. It would be very interesting to see if any of these theories can be couched in a form that would allow quantitative predictions such as that of the performance for the uniform condition already predicted by decision noise models.
(c) Can we distinguish higher order attentional mechanisms from memory?
How can we distinguish dynamic attention and attentional coding strategy predictions from memory predictions? At this point, we reach complicated empirical questions because the same sort of bottlenecks, and the same sort of dynamic or coding strategies for dealing with them, could appear in higher order processing before conscious perception or in the stages between perception and memory. In addition, the feedforward model: retinal input, via attentional processes, into perception, through coding, and into memory may be incorrect. Memory may be integral to perceptual processes with perception intrinsically involving memory templates. Such questions await further analysis and experimentation.
Previous investigators (Blackmore et al. 1995; CarlsonRadvansky & Irwin 1995; Dennett 1991; O'Regan 1992; Palmer 1995; Rensink et al. 1997; Verghese & Pelli 1992) have suggested that incapacities of pre-perceptual processing or in short-term memory formation may be the cause of change blindness. We would like to suggest that consideration must be paid to still another bottleneck: in retrieval from memory. (It was brought to our attention by an anonymous reviewer that the same suggestion was made by Simons (1996, footnote 6) .) This certainly would not immediately spring to mind, as it is much more obvious to think of bottlenecks in the`incoming' processing. However, reports of implicit memory in normal and clinical cases (Roediger 1990; Schacter 1992 ) lend support to the view that this possibility needs to be, at least, investigated. In such cases, direct tests of memory indicate that stimuli have not been remembered, but indirect tests show e¡ects of stimuli on subsequent performance. Also, consideration should be paid to the possibility of de¢cits (such as inabilities to deal with the increasing load from complex stimuli) in the capabilities of the comparison mechanism used to tell if patterns are the same or di¡erent.
(d) What is represented in short-term visual memory?
The argument above has indicated the possibility that change blindness may be a higher level attentional phenomenon or one of memory. The following points, set in the context of an analysis of short-term memory, apply mutatis mutandis to analyses of such higher order perceptual processes.
We have shown that change blindness can be demonstrated for simple contrast changes in uncued mixed nonnaturalistic patterns. Moreover, contrast changes can be detected for single-element patterns, for uniform patterns and for cued mixed patterns. It seems unlikely that the detectability of such tiny changes in contrast re£ects sparse coding of abstract semantic information in shortterm memory (Blackmore et al. 1995; Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin 1995; Dennett 1991; O'Regan 1992) . This does not imply that abstract, semantic properties cannot be stored in short-term visual memory. It does, however, mean that sensory trace-like properties can also be stored in short-term visual memory (as suggested by a large literature on sensory working memory (Laming & Scheiwiller 1985) and memory for abstract patterns (Musen & Triesman 1990; Phillips 1974; Simons 1996) ), and that change blindness can be observed for these properties. Change blindness may be due to a limit on capacity. This, however, does not imply exclusively abstract coding, rather that abstract codes may be used, in addition to trace coding to more e¤ciently deal with these capacity limits.
Theories of working memory cannot exclude sensory properties. It may be that a more generalized theory of short-term memory, including sensory traces as well as abstract representations, may provide a common mechanism for various types of change blindness. However, such theories need to be posed in a way that explicitly explains how quantitative contrast information is coded. They also need to explain why abstract coding fails to improve performance in situations when one would expect such a strategy should naturally do so (Pashler 1988) .
CONCLUSIONS
The phenomenology of change blindness has been shown to occur for simple, non-naturalistic, stimuli. This poses problems for both higher-level,`cognitive' and lowlevel,`psychophysical' approaches to visual perception. On one hand, a symbolic coding explanation cannot be applied to de¢cits for this type of task. On the other hand, conventional psychophysical theories, even with modi¢cations for early attentional factors, cannot explain the size of these e¡ects.
It appears that the bulk of the e¡ects are related either to higher order perceptual processes or to memory processes. We believe that the localization of these e¡ects may be elucidated by further psychophysical and neurophysiological studies. In particular, the simple stimulus paradigm presented here may well be used to advantage by single unit and imaging neurophysiological studies.
